Access control is an important component of any database management system. Several access control models have been proposed for conventional databases. However, these models do not seem adequate for geographical databases, due to the peculiarities of geographical data. Previous work on access control models for geographical data mainly concerns raster maps (images). In this paper, we present a discretionary access control model for geographical maps. We assume that each map is composed of a set of features. Each feature is represented in one or more maps by spatial objects, described by means of different spatial properties: geometric properties, describing the shape, extension and location of the objects, and topological properties, describing the topological relationships existing among objects. The proposed access control model allows the security administrator to define authorizations against map objects at a very fine granularity level, taking into account the various spatial representations and the object dimension. The model also supports both positive and negative authorizations as well as different propagation rules that make access control very flexible. 
INTRODUCTION
Geographical data have a strategic relevance in a large variety of contexts, like homeland security, marketing analysis tools and environmental risks control procedures. Most applications in these areas require a fine-granularity flexible access control to geographical information. A possible naive approach to support access control is to build ad hoc datasets (maps) for each type of access the administrator wants to grant: this has been the cartographic approach applied for many years in the past. Such an approach is not suitable when the user community is large and dynamicwhich is today often the case in Web-based systems. Moreover, such an approach does not support flexible protection granularities and dynamic changes in the access control policies. The introduction of integrated GIS systems, characterized by high level comprehensive data models, is today making possible the development of advanced access control models which go beyond such naive approach. However, despite the importance of data protection, no efforts have been devoted to the investigation of access control models and systems for GIS.
Several access control models have been proposed for conventional database systems. However, these models are not adequate for geographical databases, because of the peculiarities of geographical maps. Objects in these maps can be represented with different dimensions and the accesses can also be driven by the reference space (i.e., authorization to access only data concerning geographical entities in a given region). Moreover, geographical data can be represented using different approaches. The users of a GIS system usually recognize geographical data from the existence of a geometry describing the shape, extension and location of some geographical objects (features). However, geographical data can be represented also in other forms, for example by using a set of topological relations (topological representation), that specify the adiacency, the disjointness or other kind of interaction between two features. Those various representations should be taken into account when defining an access control model.
Previous work on access control models for geographical data has mainly dealt with raster maps (images) [1] , focusing on confidentiality for sensible information that can be revealed by high resolution image satellites. In such model, each protected object is basically an image or portion of an image. Thus, the model supports neither the vector-based representation of features nor the topological one. As such, the model is not adequate for usage in current GIS and spatial DBMS. Moreover, it only deals with read privileges and it is thus not adequate for dynamic applications requiring data modifications. In [5, 4] , an extension of the classical discretionary access control model is proposed to protect vector-based spatial data against requests issued through a Web service. In such a proposal, spatial data consist of objects having a geometry compliant with the OpenGIS simple features model [3] . In the proposed access control model, authorizations on spatial objects can be applied on limited areas (windows) within the reference space. As an example, a user may be authorized to insert road objects only if the roads are located in a well defined region. Windows define the geographical scope of authorizations, thus making authorizations themselves geographical objects which occupy a position in the reference space.
In this paper, we present an access control model for geographical maps, admitting multiple (vector-based and topological) representations. We assume maps to be represented according to the Layered Spatial Data Model (LSDM) [2] . Such model is based on the concept of feature type. Examples of feature types are roads, lakes, and so on. Each map contains various instances of the feature types (several roads, several lakes, and so on), each represented with a given dimension (0 if they are represented as points, 1 if they are lines, 2 if they are represented as regions). Each specific feature is associated inside a map with at least one spatial representation (geometric or topological). LSDM provides a query language that allows one to express complex queries on the maps and features of an LSDM database instance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only data model that provides representation and query capabilities for objects with multiple spatial representations. The LSDM model and language thus represent the right context for defining a general enough access control mechanism.
The proposed access control model takes into account several requirements previously discussed. It allows one to specify authorizations against map objects at a very fine granularity level. It also takes into account the various spatial representations and the object dimension. For example, under the proposed model, the administrator can authorize a user to see a given object at 0 dimension and not at higher dimensions, thus hiding detailed information about the object shape. The model also supports both positive authorizations, giving permissions, and negative authorizations, specifying denials, as well as various propagation rules making access control very flexible. Moreover, similarly to [5] , the model supports the concept of authorization window, specifying the region of space in which the authorization applies.
Since there are some similarities between the model adopted for spatial data and the typical object-oriented data models, in order to develop our access control model we took into account access control models proposed for objectoriented databases [6, 10, 11] . In particular, we borrowed the concepts of weak and strong authorizations from the authorization model of Orion [10] . In Orion, an authorization is strong if it, and any authorization it implies, cannot be overridden by other authorizations. By contrast, authorizations implied by a weak authorization can be overridden. With respect to the Orion model, spatial data require more sophisticated propagation mechanisms like the type of spatial representation of the objects (geometric or topological) or the dimensional level of their spatial representations.
The proposed access control model consistently differs from the one presented in [5, 4] . Indeed: (i) the map model is more complex, providing multiple representations (geometric and topological) of the same map object and multiple representations of the same feature; (ii) in [5, 4] propagation is only allowed along application-dependent privilege hierarchies; on the other hand, in our model propagation rules constitute an invariant part of the access control model and are defined along object and privilege hierarchies; (iii) differently from [5, 4] , both positive and negative authorizations, as well as a mechanism to define exceptions to propagated authorizations, are supported.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present the adopted map data model. In Section 3 we define the basic elements of the authorization model. Access control model and mechanisms are then presented in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 presents some conclusions and outlines future work.
TOPOLOGICAL SPATIAL DATA MODEL
In this paper we consider a modified version of the Layered Spatial Data Model (LSDM) [2] . We call this model Topological Spatial Data Model (TSDM), since we keep only the topological layer of LSDM beyond the geometric one. This modification allows us to simplify the definition of the access control model without reducing significantly its expressive power.
In TSDM the schema of a spatial database can be defined as a set of feature types and a set of map types. A map type is a set of feature types and a feature type can belong to different map types. Each feature type has some descriptive attributes and one spatial attribute. The spatial attribute of a feature type can be represented in different maps with different dimensions. Formally, a spatial database schema in TSDM can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Spatial Database Schema). The schema of a spatial database in TSDM is a 5-tuple S = (E , n(), DomE (), M, Map()) where:
• E = {E1, ..., E k } is a set of feature type identifiers.
• • M = {M1, ..., M h } is a set of map types.
• Feature and map types are also called schema objects. ✷
The fact that a feature type has one or more geometric domains associated with it in different map types does not imply that a feature will have in the database a geometric representation. Indeed, the spatial representation of a feature can exist in one or both the layers, that are available in a map. We briefly present these layers here (more details can be found in [2] ).
• Geometric layer (Dgeo): in this layer, shape and location on the earth surface of features are represented. Geometric values belong to one of the following sets: the set of points in the Euclidean plane E 2 , the set of simple connected or not connected polylines in E 2 , and the set of simple polygons of E 2 delimited by a simple closed polyline or by a set of closed polylines (not connected polygons).
• Topological layer (Dtopo): in this layer the spatial properties of each feature are represented by describing the topological relations of the feature with other features of the map [9] . The reference set of topological relations is {Disjoint, T ouch, In, Contains, Equal, Cross, Overlap}. These relations are binary, mutually exclusive (if one is true, the others are false) and they are a refinement of the well-known set of topological relations proposed in [7] .
Given a TSDM schema, a TSDM instance can be defined as follows.
• A set of feature type extensions
Each feature e ∈ I(Ei) is a tuple belonging to the do-
• In [2] , a query language for TSDM has also been proposed. It is an algebra with the following types of operators:
• Feature-based operators: they are applied to feature sets and produce feature sets; they are very similar to the operators of the relational algebra. Examples of feature based operators are traditional relational op-
, and the usual set based operators (union ∪, difference \, intersection ∩).
• Map-based operators: they are applied to maps and produce new maps. Among them, we recall:
, that takes a map instance I(Mi) and selects all the map elements satisfying a certain
, that takes two map instances I(Mi) and I(Mj) and returns a new map instance containing all the elements of the first map instance related as specified in F to some element of the second map instance; usual set based operators (union, intersection, difference) can be applied on maps.
• Mixed operators: they are applied to maps and feature sets and produce either maps or sets of features. Among them, we recall: mixed projection (Π • Qmap : find all the map objects representing the 'MI-VE' railway from Milan to Venice.
• QFset : find all the counties with more that 100,000 inhabitants.
σ County.N≥100,000 (I(County)). ✷
BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE AUTHO-RIZATION MODEL
The proposed access control model relies on the classical discretionary model centered on the notion of authorization [10] . An authorization is traditionally a tuple (S, O, P ), where: S is the subject of the authorization, i.e. the entity benefitting from it, for example a user or group of users; O is the object, i.e. the logical data structure that needs to be protected, for example a map; and P is the privilege, i.e. the kind of operations that can be performed on the object. The object and the privilege are strictly dependent on the data model. In our model, additional components, all described in the following, include the authorization sign, specifying whether the privilege has to be granted (+) or denied (-); the authorization type, specifying whether the authorization can be overridden (weak) or not (strong); the window, i.e., a spatial object representing the region of space over which the authorization can be granted; the query, further restricting the set of objects over which the privilege is granted or denied; the grantor, i.e., the user assigning the authorization to the subject; the grant option, which when true denotes that the subject itself can further grant the (positive) authorization to other users.
Subjects and objects
Subjects. Subjects are all users that interact with the system. The access control model we are going to present does not support groups and roles, even if it can be easily extended to deal with them. In the following, we denote with U the set of all the users.
Objects. In a TSDM database, both schema, group, and instance objects have to be protected. Schema objects can be protected with respect to operations concerning access to their definition (metadata). Instance objects can be protected with respect to selection, deletion, and update. Group objects can be protected with respect to operations concerning their extensions (insertion, deletion, update, selection).
It is important to note that even if, similarly to the relational context, queries are defined against maps and feature sets, unlike the relational context, in a geographical database it is very important to deal with single instances. Indeed, the spatial representation of a feature can be very detailed and thus can be of great interest to a specific user.
In the following, given a TSDM schema S = (E , n(), DomE (), M, Map()) and its instance I(S) = (I(E ), I(M)), we denote: with OFT and OMT the set of feature types E of S and the set of map types M, respectively; with OM and OF the set of maps I(M) and the set of feature sets I(E ), respectively; with OMO and OFE the set of all map objects of the maps I(M) and the set of all features of the feature sets I(E ), respectively.
Privileges
Privileges can be classified according to the object on which they can be granted (see Table 1 ). Various privileges can be assigned on instance objects, corresponding to the various operations that can be executed on them (selection, deletion, and update of an instance) and to their spatial properties (dimension, type of spatial representation). We call these privileges instance privileges. Instance privileges can also be assigned on group objects with the following meaning: an instance privilege p assigned to a group object o is propagated, following a precise rule, to the instance objects belonging to o. An additional privilege is assigned to group objects, in order to insert a feature into a feature set or to assign an object to a map (insertion privileges). Finally, for schema objects, we consider access to their definition as a privilege (schema privileges). In the following, we denote with P the set of all the privileges. • Privilege selM (1, geo), granted on M rail map, allows the user to read the geometric representation of the M rail map objects with dimension 1 (i.e., railways).
• Privilege assignM (0), granted on M rail map, allows the user to insert a map object of dimension 0 (i.e., an accident).
• Since not all types of privileges apply to all possible types of object, we introduce a function, called scope that, taken a privilege, returns the set of objects to which the privilege can be assigned. According to Table 1 , the main problem arises with privileges for map objects, since they must be represented at the layer and the dimension required by the privilege. 
Authorization sign and type
In the proposed model, positive and negative authorizations can be specified (authorization sign). A positive authorization establishes that a subject is authorized for a given privilege on a given object, whereas a negative authorization establishes that a subject is denied access to a given object under a given privilege. Thus, a subject u may be denied access to object o because either u has no authorization on o or u has a negative authorization on o. We give precedence to negative authorizations: if u has both a positive and a negative authorization on o, u is denied access to o.
The authorization type specifies whether an authorization can be overridden or not. More precisely, weak authorizations can be overridden by strong authorizations. Weak and strong authorizations, when combined with authorization sign, are a useful mechanism for modeling exceptions. For example, if user u can update all instances of a given map m but a certain instance o, we can grant a weak positive authorization to u for updating m (thus, all instance of m can be updated by u) and then a negative update authorization on o.
Weak and strong authorizations can also be defined for instance and schema objects, as well as on group objects and insertion privileges. Even if authorizations for such objects and privileges are not propagated, the authorization type can be used to give precedence to positive authorizations with respect to negative ones, as we will see in Section 4.
Queries and windows
In order to specify authorizations for subsets of group object extensions, content-based access control is provided by specifying a TSDM query as part of authorizations. The query restricts the set of objects to which the authorization applies. The query can be specified for all privileges affecting objects already existing in the database.
In order to spatially restrict the assignment of new objects to a map, we also introduce the concept of window as the region that the assigned objects must intersect. We define a window as an object belonging to the TSDM geometric domain D polygons . Thus, it consists of a (collection) of simple polygons with no holes. Note that windows can be useful also for spatial instance privileges. However, since they apply to existing objects, in those cases the effect of the window can be obtained by specifying a query containing a map selection operator. For the sake of usability, both modalities are allowed in the model. When both of them are present, the authorization is applied to all the objects of the query result, intersecting the window.
Authorization grantor and grant option
The grantor is the subject that granted the authorization. Likewise the classical authorization models, we assume that a subject can delegate the administration of the authorization to some other subject. The mechanism used for delegating such functions is that of the grant option. The grant option is expressed as a Boolean variable; if it is true, the subject is authorized to grant/revoke the authorization to/from other subjects. The grant option is specified only for positive authorizations; negative authorizations cannot be delegated.
THE GEOGRAPHIC ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
In our access control model, an authorization is a tuple containing all the components introduced in Section 3. Not all possible tuples, however, represent authorizations. Indeed, tuple components must satisfy some properties depending on the object and the privilege they consider. First of all, the object must belong to the privilege scope. Moreover, authorizations admit the specification of the window and the query components only for group objects. More precisely, the window can be specified only for spatial privileges (either instance or insertion privileges). The query, for instance privileges, is an expression of the TSDM query language returning a subset of the group object extension. For insertion privileges, the query does not seem reasonable. However, when assigning objects to a map, it could be useful to restrict the privilege to objects with a certain feature type. To model this requirement, the query component of such authorizations is extended to represent a specific feature type. 
Definition 4 (Authorization). An authorization is a tuple of the form u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q , where:
Ability to assign a feature to a map (i.e., to insert a map object) with dimension d, inserting spatial information inside at least one layer of the map. Object: Map objects
Ability to read spatial information at layer t and dimension d for the considered map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered).
Ability to update the spatial information for the considered map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered).
Ability to delete a certain map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered). Note that after a deletion the feature still exists but it is no more assigned to the considered map object. Legenda: schema(ft): schema of the feature type the considered feature is an instance of. 
The authorization set B authorizes Ted (grantor=Bob) to: (a8): read the geometry of M rail map objects intersecting Milan City (window restriction); (a9): update the spatial representation of Accident features due to "wrong manouevre" and of name "X", only inside the window Milan City (window restriction). The authorization set C authorizes Ted (grantor=Bob) to read the geometry of M rail map objects with no window restriction (a10). ✷
Authorization u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q states that g has granted u (denied if pt = −) privilege p on a set of objects, depending on o, p, w, and q. We call these objects authorization extension. Due to the complexity of the map model, the definition of the authorization extension simplifies the definition of access control mechanisms. The definition uses the concept of privilege scope, introduced in Definition 3.
Definition 5 (Authorization extension). Let a = u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q . The authorization extension of a, denoted by ext(a), is the set of objects defined as follows:
• if o is a map object or a schema object, ext(a) = {o};
• if o is a feature set and p is a non-spatial privilege, ext(a) = {o |o ∈ q(o)}; 
The extension in this case coincides with the subset of map objects corresponding to a spatial representation of the correct type (i.e., in the scope of C(p)) of at least one feature in q(o), intersecting the window w; • if o is a map type and p is an instance privilege, ext(a) = {o |o ∈ q(o), o ∈ s(p), o Intersect w}, i.e., the extension coincides with the subset of objects in q(o) and in the scope of p, intersecting w;
• if o is a group object and p is an insertion privilege, ext(a) = {o}. ✷ Given a set of authorizations, two properties must be satisfied. The first, minimality, imposes that the window and the query be unique for the authorization granted by g to subject s with grant option go, on object o, with privilege p, privilege type pt, and type t. Therefore, if an authorization has to be specified on disjoint regions, the authorization window should be specified as a collection of disjoint polygons (an admitted value of D polygons ). The second, grant safety, specifies how the presence of a window constrains the authorizations that can be granted by u. More precisely, authorizations with grant option (go = true) can be granted to other users only if pt = + and the window of the granted authorizations is contained in the corresponding windows of the grantor. We also assume that the Security Administrator (SA) can grant all possible authorizations, without constraints. Sets of rules satisfying previous properties define a correct authorization set. 
Definition 6 (Correct authorization set). Let A be a set of authorizations. A is a correct authorization set (CAS) if the following properties are satisfied:
• Minimality: ∃a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1.u = a2.u, a1.o = a2.o, a1.p = a2.p,
AUTHORIZATION CONTROL MECHA-NISM
Given a CAS A, the aim of the authorization control mechanism is to determine whether to grant or reject an access request according to what has been specified in A. In general, an access request is a triple u, p, o stating that a user u wants to exercise privilege p on object o. In order to check the request, we must consider which other authorizations can be derived from the ones in A. This is achieved by defining specific derivation rules.
In the following, we first present derivation rules and we formally define the authorization base. Then, we show how the authorization base can be used to answer access requests. 3 ∪ on {q1, ..., qn} produces as result the query expression q1 ∪ ... ∪ qn. 4 A query q1 is contained in another query q2 if for any
update (2) update (1) update (0) update (d,TOPO)
delete (1) delete (2) (b) 
Derivation rules
Given a CAS A, other authorizations can be derived from those in A. Derivation between authorizations can be specified by using derivation rules. Given an authorization having a certain form, each derivation rule specifies which other authorizations are implied by it. When this happens, we say that authorization a2 is derived from authorization a1, denoted by a2 ← a1.
Two different groups of derivation rules can be identified, depending on whether the derivation considers relationships between objects or relationships between privileges. In the following, both groups of authorizations are described.
Derivation over object relationships
Among the objects defined in Section 3.1, it is possible to define some relationships such as if an authorization a exists for object o1 and there exists a relationship between o1 and another object o2, a is propagated from o1 to o2. The considered relationships between objects are graphically represented in Figure 3 (a). Authorizations should be propagated from group objects to their instances. Moreover, because of the logical binding between a feature and its spatial representation in one or more map objects inside maps, authorizations for map objects can be derived from authorizations for features. This can be useful, for instance, when we want to grant a user the privilege to access the spatial representation of the instances of a certain feature type.
Next rule specifies derivation between group objects and their instances. u, p, pt, g, go, o , t, , ⊥ ← u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q . Next rule specifies derivation between features and map objects. This derivation applies only to privileges for map objects, i.e., those involving spatial representations. a = u, p, pt, g, go, f, 
Rule 2. Let

Derivation over privilege relationships
Due to the nature of spatial objects, additional derivation rules can be defined in order to take into account object dimension and spatial layer. Such information are contained in the granted privileges.
The most informative layer is certainly the geometric one, since topological information can be computed from it but the converse is not true. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that an authorization granting a privilege for the geometric layer has to be propagated to the topological layer. On the other hand, an authorization denying a privilege for the topological layer has to be propagated to the geometric one.
Similar rules can be defined by considering object dimension. Indeed, an authorization granting a privilege to objects with a certain dimension has to be propagated to objects with lower dimension (e.g., if a user can select regions, he can also select lines and points). On the other hand, an authorization denying a privilege to objects with a certain dimension has to be propagated to objects with higher dimension (e.g., if a user cannot select points, it cannot select neither lines nor regions).
In order to formally introduce derivations between privileges, we introduce a partial order < among them. We say that p1 < p2 if and only if: (i) p1 = p 1 (d1, t1), p2 = p 2 (d2, t2) and either (t1 = geo and t2 = top) or (t1 = t2 and d1 < d2); (ii) p1 = p 1 (d1), p2 = p 2 (d2) and d1 < d2 (see Figure 3(b) ). Next rule formally specifies derivations based on such privilege ordering. Note that the rule can be applied only to objects belonging to the scope of the derived privilege.
Rule 3. Let p1 ∈ P, p2 ∈ P such that p1 < p2 and o ∈ s(p1) ∩ s(p2 
Algorithms for access control
Given a CAS A, based on the derivation rules presented above, we can now define the authorization base as the set of authorizations contained in A extended with those derived from A. The construction of the authorization base guarantees that it represents a correct authorization set. Proof Sketch: The proof follows from the following considerations: (i) The longest derivation can be obtained by considering authorizations on group objects or features (otherwise Rules 1 and 2 are not used). (ii) Given an authorization a such that a.o is a group object or a feature, the longest derivation starting from a is obtained by first applying Rule 3 to a. According to Figure 3 , this can be done at most 3 times. Then, if a.o is a group object, Rule 1 can be applied once for each object belonging to the extension of a.o, which is lower than or equal to no. If a.o is a feature, Rule 2 can be applied at most once for each map object corresponding to a.o. Since maps are at most nm, the number of map objects is at most equal to nm. (iii) From the previous consideration, since we assume that nm <<< no, it follows that from each authorization a we can generate at most 3na,o authorizations. Thus, from A, we can generate at most 3nona authorizations. Thus, the cardinality of AB(A) is linear in na and no. (iv) On the other hand, in order to construct AB(A), windows have to be combined, thus, each authorization in the set has to be compared with all the others. Thus, the complexity is quadratic in na and no. Given an access request r = u, p, o , stating that a user u wants to exercise privilege p on object o, and a CAS A, the problem arises of establishing whether the request can or cannot be satisfied and on which set of objects. To this purpose, the authorization base is used. More precisely, given an authorization a, we say that r = u, p, o depends on a if and only if a = u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q , i.e., a grants or deny privilege p to u over object o. According to what we presented in Section 4, the access request can be satisfied if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
Definition 7 (Authorization Base
1. r depends on a strong positive authorization and on no strong negative authorizations;
2. r depends on a weak positive authorization, on no weak negative authorizations, and on no strong authorizations.
In all the other cases, the access has to be denied. This means that, in presence of strong authorizations, weak ones are not considered. For both weak and strong authorizations, negative authorizations have precedence with respect to positive ones. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have presented a new access control model for geographical maps. Our model supports both positive and negative authorizations, permits inheritance of the authorizations according to the objects hierarchy and propagation of authorizations, taking into account object dimension and type of spatial information.
It is interesting to note that a window assigns an authorization a spatial extent. An authorization thus can be considered itself an entity with spatial and non spatial properties and as such it can be modeled as a TSDM feature with a specific feature type. Moreover, the set of windows can be represented in TSDM as an authorization map. As a result, a uniform model is applied for representing and querying application data and authorizations.
As part of future work, we plan to develop efficient techniques for authorization administration and for access control enforcement, based on the use of logic programming techniques. An additional issue we plan to investigate concerns the development of similar access control models for GIS standards [8] .
